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ABSTRACT 
 
Shareholders’ Agreements are contractual devices to manage tensions among shareholders of a 
corporation. These agreements have a wide scope related to shareholders’ interest. Nevertheless, 
before subscribing a shareholder agreement is important to determine the requirements to make it 
enforceable. This issue has been addressed in the last twenty years by state corporate statutes 
following the Model Business Corporation Act and the Delaware General Corporation Law and 
in different court decisions. Today, shareholders’ agreements will be enforced according to the 
terms defined by the parties unless the agreement injures non-participating shareholders, third 
parties or is against public policy.    
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CHAPTER I 
INTRODUCTION 
 
Closely held corporations are the more common corporate forms of organization.1 Most 
of the enterprises in the United States are closely held corporations.2 The close corporation 
category includes a whole variety of enterprises like family-owned business, high-tech start-ups, 
small firms and mature publicly held corporations, post-leveraged buyouts.3 Closely held 
corporations are corporations with concentrated ownership.4 
Shareholders of close corporations, either small, family-owned or big in assets and 
structure, ordinarily enter into different kinds of agreements to regulate the most important 
relations of the corporation.5 Shareholders’ agreements could include a whole variety of issues, 
like voting of shares for the election of directors, who are to be officers of the corporation, long-
term employment for some of the participants in the agreement and salaries, a power to veto 
corporate decisions, circumstances to declare dividends and methods of resolving disputes, 
among others.6  
In the past, the norms in state statutes were established mostly to protect shareholders and 
investors in publicly held corporations where management and ownership are divided and the 
                                                 
1 Frank H. Easterbrook and Daniel R. Fischel, Close Corporations and Agency Costs, 39 STAN. L. REV. 271, 271 
(1986). The terms “close corporation” and “closely held corporation” will be considered to be synonymous and will 
be used interchangeably. See infra Chapter II Section B of this document for the concept of close corporation.  
2 George J. Siedel, Close Corporation Law: Michigan, Delaware and the Model Act, 11 DEL. J. CORP. L. 383, 384 
(1986). 
3 Edward B. Rock and Michael L. Watcher, Waiting for the Omelet to Set: Match-Specific Assets and Minority 
Oppression in Close Corporations, 24 J. CORP. L. 913, 913 (1999).  
4 Id. 
5 Official Comment MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT § 7.32. 
6 F. HODGE O’NEAL and ROBERT B. THOMPSON, O’NEAL and THOMPSON’S CLOSE CORPORATIONS and LLCs: LAW 
and PRACTICE VOLUME 1 1-2 (West Third Revised Edition 2005) [“hereinafter” O’NEIL and THOMPSON]. 
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mechanisms established address this reality.7 At the same time, court decisions were uncertain 
and confusing about the validity and enforceability of shareholders’ agreements in the context of 
close corporations. 8 Decisions were normally hostile to contracts which modified the classic 
structure of functions and roles among shareholders, directors and officers.9 This situation has 
changed in recent years. 
Modern state statutes contain provisions regulating shareholders’ agreements validating 
their celebration and implementation.10 In addition, modern court decisions have shown a 
favorable view toward shareholders’ agreements, considering them enforceable and valid.11 
Under this new trend, the legal system recognizes the existence of fundamental differences in 
structure, functions and necessities between publicly-held corporations and closely-held 
corporations.12 
This document explores the requirements for enforcement of shareholders’ agreements in 
the context of the close corporation. Chapter II will present a basic approach to the internal 
affairs doctrine and the concept of a close corporation. Chapter III will explain the nature and 
basic functions of shareholders’ agreements. Chapter IV will explain the classes of shareholders’ 
agreements and the issues which are normally covered in them. Chapter V will consider the 
                                                 
7 Id. at 5:2-5:24. 
8 Id. at 5:103-104. 
9 Id. 
10 Official Comment Section 7.32 MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT. See Robert B. Thompson, The Law’s Limits on 
Contracts in a Corporation, 15 J. CORP. LAW 377, 393-394 (commenting that “[i]n most states, modern corporation 
statutes now permit contracting around those statutory rules which previously mandated that centralized control rest 
with the board of directors. Most statutes now also recognize agreements to limit the transferability of shares or to 
authorize voting requirements for corporate action that differ from “majority rule” norms specified in the statute. In 
most states, these changes appear in the general corporations codes and are available to all corporations even though 
the impetus seems to have been to assist closely held corporations. Special status, now found in almost half the 
states and available only to certain statutorily defined close corporations, allows even greater freedom for parties to 
depart form statutory norms.”).  
11 Official Comment Section 7.32 MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT. 
12 See Easterbrook and Fischel, supra note 1, at 271. 
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evolution process for the enforcement of shareholders’ agreements, the statutory requirements 
for enforcement in the Model Business Corporation Act and the Delaware General Corporation 
Law and the issues which concern judges when enforcing these agreements. 
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CHAPTER II 
AN APPROACH TO UNITED STATES CLOSE CORPORATIONS 
 
A. INTERNAL AFFAIRS DOCTRINE 
The American Corporate System is state-centered.13 Every state offers a specific set of 
rules for the business interested in incorporation.14 In this manner, corporate statutes could be 
viewed as state by-products and the private corporations as their consumers.15 This system 
creates a competition among the states to get the companies and, consequently the fees and taxes 
which come with incorporation.16 
The question to be answered is which state’s law is applied to the corporation. Two 
different subjects must be separated in this matter: the internal affairs of the corporation and the 
business of the corporation.17 Internal affairs is considered the relationships between the 
corporation and its current officers, directors, and shareholders.18 The business of the corporation 
is considered the relationship between the corporation and its clients, creditors and workers.19 
For the scope of this document, the question will focus on the internal affairs issue. 
The internal affairs of the corporation are covered by the Internal Affairs Doctrine.20 
Under this doctrine, courts look to the law of the state of incorporation in dealing with a 
                                                 
13 ROBERTA ROMANO, FOUNDATIONS OF CORPORATE LAW 84 (Foundation Press ed. 1993) [“hereinafter” ROMANO].  
14 CHARLES R. T. O’KELLEY AND ROBERT B. THOMPSON, CORPORATIONS AND OTHER BUSINESS ORGANIZATIONS 
140 (Aspen Publishers 4th ed. 2003) [“hereinafter” O’KELLEY and THOMPSON]. 
15 ROMANO, supra note 13, at 82. 
16 O’KELLEY and THOMPSON, supra note 14, at 140.  
17 See FRANKLIN A. GEVURTZ, CORPORATION LAW 35-36 (West Group ed. 2000) [“hereinafter” GEVURTZ]. 
18 Id.  
19 Id. 
20 Norwood P. Beveridge, Jr., The Internal Affairs Doctrine: The Proper Law of a Corporation, 44 BUS. LAW 693, 
(1989). 
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corporation’s internal affairs.21 Therefore, businessmen decide the rules for internal affairs by 
choosing the state of incorporation.22 At the same time, this doctrine guarantees that other states 
will recognize corporations incorporated in another state and that their courts will apply the law 
of the state of incorporation in matters of internal affairs.23 
The United States Supreme Court stated in Edgar v. MITE Corp.24 the usefulness of this 
doctrine as follows: “The internal affairs doctrine is a conflict of laws principle which recognize 
that only one State should have the authority to regulate a corporation’s internal affairs … 
because otherwise a corporation could be faced with conflicting demands…”. 
In this context, this document will consider mainly two statutes in the United States: The 
Model Business Corporation Act [“hereinafter” MBCA] and the Delaware General Corporation 
Law [“hereinafter” D.G.C.L.]. The MBCA was developed by the American Bar Association 
Section of Business Law, Committee on Corporate Law; most states based their rules on this 
statute.25 On the other hand, the D.G.C.L. has become the preeminent American corporate law 
jurisdiction, playing a dominant role in the United States corporations system.26  
 
                                                 
21 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICTS LAW §302 (1971). Official Comment Section 15.05 MODEL BUS. CORP. 
ACT. 
22 O’KELLEY and THOMPSON, supra note 14, at 140. 
23 Id. 
24 Edgar v. MITE Corp., 457 U.S. 624, 645-46 (1982). 
25 See O’KELLEY and THOMPSON, supra note 14, at 141. See also COMMITTEE OF CORPORATE LAWS, ABA SECTION 
of BUSINESS, MANAGING CLOSELY HELD CORPORATIONS, A LEGAL GUIDEBOOK, Preface vii (2003). (commenting 
that “[t]he Model Act serves as the primary basis for the corporation statutes in approximately half of the states, and 
many of its provisions have been adopted in almost all of the other states.”).  
26 O’KELLEY and THOMPSON, supra note 14, at 141 (commenting that “[d]ifferences among the states are not as 
great as they once were. Successful Delaware innovations are quickly copied by the MBCA, and vice versa. In 
addition, there is substantial uniformity in the so-called common law of corporations. Courts in one state may 
borrow freely from the jurisprudence developed by courts in other states. Delaware, as the home of so many publicly 
traded corporations, again played a dominant role. Delaware courts are frequently called on to decide major 
questions of corporate law and have developed a large body of judicial rules and precedent on major corporate law 
issues, and courts in other jurisdictions routinely cite their decisions. Indeed, Delaware case law frames much of the 
debate about the structure of corporate law.”).  
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B. CONCEPT OF CLOSE CORPORATION 
The concept of ‘close corporation’ seems difficult to reduce to an all-purpose 
description.27 In fact, it is possible to find a variety of definitions describing what it is.28 The 
scope of the concept will depend on the statute of the state,29 the court which has decided the 
case30 or the author’s opinion31. Nevertheless, the definition of a ‘close corporation’ normally 
includes three different aspects of the structure of a corporation.32 
                                                 
27 Carlos D. Israels, The Close Corporation and the Law, 33 CORNELL L.Q. 488, 491 (1948). 
28 See O’NEIL and THOMPSON, supra note 6, at 1-2. 
29 See DEL. CODE ANN., Title 8 § 342(a) (2005) (“(a) A close corporation is a corporation organized under this 
chapter whose certificate of incorporation contains the provisions required by §102 of this title and, in addition, 
provides that: (1) All of the corporation’s issue stock of all classes, exclusive of treasury shares, shall be represented 
by certificates and shall be held of record by not more than a specified number of persons, not exceeding 30; and (2) 
All if the issued stock of all classes shall be subjected to 1 or more of the restrictions on transfer permitted by §202 
of this title; and (3) The corporation shall make not offering of any of its stock of any class which would constitute a 
“public offering” within the meaning of the United States Securities Act of 1993 as it may be amended from time to 
time”). See also Model Statutory Close Corporation Supplement (providing that in the articles of incorporation must 
be stated that the corporation is a statutory close corporation and a “corporation having 50 or fewer shareholders 
may become a statutory close corporation”). The Model Statutory Close Corporation Supplement is not part of the 
Model Business Corporation Act. The Model is an optional statute developed for states that determine that it is 
advisable to enact and integrate a statute dealing with the problems of closely held corporations (MODEL BUS. CORP. 
ACT ANN., Introductory Comment Model Statutory Close Corporation Supplement, Vol. 4 Section 1, CC-3 (3ed. 
(2005)). 
30 See United States v. Byrum, 408 U.S. 125, 149 N.34 (1972) (describing that the typical close corporation “is 
small, has a checkered earning record, and has nor market for its shares.”). See also Donahue v. Rodd Electrotype 
Co., 367 Mass. 578, 586, 328 N.E. 2d. 505, 511 (1975) (“We deem a close corporation to be typified by: (1) a small 
number of stockholders; (2) no ready market of the corporate stock; and (3) substantial majority stockholder 
participation in the management, direction and operation of the corporation.”). 
31 See Melvin Aron Eisenberg, Contractual Freedom in Corporate Law: Articles & Comments: The Structure of 
Corporate Law, 89 COLUM. L. REV. 1461, 1461 (1989) (describing a close corporation as a “corporations that have 
a small number of shareholders, most of whom either participate in or directly monitor corporate management.”). 
See also O’NEIL and THOMPSON, supra note 6, at 1-2 (describing that “close corporation is a corporation whose 
shares are not generally traded in the securities market.”). See also COMMITTEE OF CORPORATE LAWS, supra 27, at 3 
(“A closely held corporation is most commonly defined as a corporation that has a relatively small number of 
shareholders and no active trading market for its securities”). See also Israels, supra note 29, at 488 (describing that 
“[t]he “close corporation” is an enterprise in corporate form in which management and ownership are substantially 
identical.”). 
32 See Donahue v. Rodd Electrotype Co., 367 Mass. 578, 586, 328 N.E. 2d. 505, 511 (1975). 
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The first aspect is related to an objective feature of shareholders. The objective 
characteristic is the number of shareholders.33 Normally, a small number of shareholders are the 
owners of the complete stock in close corporations.34 The D.G.C.L. and the MBCA include a 
limit in the number of shareholders for a corporation to be considered ‘close’.35 This feature is a 
consequence of the fact that participants in close corporations normally are familiar or have other 
personal relations in addition to the business relationship.36 
The second aspect is related to a feature of the shares. In the case of a close corporation, 
there is a lack of an organized market for the trade of the shares.37 The free transferability of 
shares common to public corporations is not present in close corporations.38 In close 
corporations, there is a restriction in the ability of investors to alienate their shares.39 
Shareholders control the transfer of shares in a way that unwanted interested investors cannot 
participate in the company.40 
The third aspect considerers the relation between shareholders and directors concerning 
ownership and management. In close corporations exists a close identity between shareholders 
and managers, which contrast radically with public corporations wherein ownership and control 
                                                 
33 See O’NEIL and THOMPSON, , supra note 6, at 1-5 
34 Sandra K. Millar, Minority Shareholder Oppression in the Private Company in the European Community: A 
Comparative Analysis of the German, United Kingdom and French “Close Corporation Problem”, 30 CORNELL 
INT’L L. J. 381, 383 (1997). 
35 See O’KELLEY and THOMPSON, supra note 14, at 141. 
36 Easterbrock and Fischel, supra note 1, at 271. See Douglas K. Moll, Shareholder Oppression in Close 
Corporations: The Unanswered Question of Perspective, 53 VAND. L. REV. 749, 757 (2000) (explaining that “close 
corporation investors are often linked by family of other personal relationships that result in a familiarity between 
the participants.”). 
37 Easterbrook and Fischel, supra note 1, at 271. See MILLAR, supra note 36, at 383 (commenting that “[i]n contrast 
to the stock of the public corporation, the stock of a private company has no ready market. Each owner is dependent 
on the other to buy out the ownership interest in the event of a dispute.”). 
38 Ralph A. Peeples, The Use and Misuse of The Business Judgment Rule in the Close Corporation, 60 NOTRE DAME 
L. REV. 456, 466 (1985). 
39 Easterbrook and Fischel, supra note 1, at 273. 
40 COMMITTEE OF CORPORATE LAWS, supra note 25, at 4. 
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are clearly separated.41 The close identity comes from the fact that the same people both manage 
and bear the risk of investment.42 Shareholders, directors and officers of the corporation are 
normally the same individuals.43 Under these circumstances, it could be very common to find in 
close corporations that earnings of the corporation are distributed among the shareholders not as 
dividends but as a salary.44  
For the purpose of this document, close corporations are those whose stock is not 
publicly traded.  
                                                 
41 Peeples, supra note 38, at 466.  
42 Easterbrook and Fischel, supra note 1, at 274. 
43 MILLAR, supra note 34, at 383. 
44 JESSE H. CHOOPER, JOHN C. COFFEE, JR., RONALD J. GIBSON, CASES AND MATERIALS ON CORPORATIONS 711 
(Aspen Publishers 5th ed. 2000) [“hereinafter” CHOOPER ET AL.]. 
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CHAPTER III 
NATURE AND FUNCTIONS OF SHAREHOLDERS’ AGREEMENTS 
 
A. NATURE OF SHAREHOLDERS’ AGREEMENTS: A CONTRACTUAL DEVICE 
A corporation from the economic perspective has been described as a “firm”.45 
Corporations are for-profit-seeking enterprises composed by persons and assets and organized by 
rules.46 The rules could be determined by i) law, ii) contracts or other forms or agreements, iii) 
corporate organs and officials, and iv) market forces.47 Shareholders’ agreements are part of the 
rules determined by “contracts or other forms of agreements”. 
A shareholder agreement is a contract.48 The object of this contract is to define the scope 
and extent of the relationship among the shareholders and between the shareholders and the 
corporation.49 The extent of the object of the contract will depend on flexibility of the legislation 
and public policy constraints on the participants.  
Additionally, from a contractual approach, the close corporation is gaps.50 Existing rules 
do not have an answer to all the different contingencies that the corporation will face in the 
future.51 In this context, shareholders’ agreements pretend to avoid in advance some of the most 
                                                 
45 See O’KELLEY and THOMPSON, supra note 14, at 1 (describing the concept of a firm from an economic 
perspective: “The “firm” is what we call the set of relations that arise when resources are allocated by the 
entrepreneur via commands to her employees rather than the set of relations that arise when an entrepreneur 
allocates resources via contract with outsiders. Thus, depicted as a circle, and using Mary, the classic 
owner/entrepreneur as an example, the Coasean firm includes Mary and her employees, but excludes the customers, 
suppliers, and creditors with whom Mary does business.”).  
46 Eisenberg, supra note 31, at 1461. 
47 Id.  
48 See Kerry M. Lavalle, Drafting Shareholder Agreements for the Closely-Held Business, 4 DEPAUL BUS. L.J. 109, 
110 (1991). 
49 Id. 
50 Charles R. O’Kelley, Jr., Filling Gaps in the Close Corporation Contract: A Transaction Cost Analysis, 87 NW. 
U.L. REV. 216, 216 (1992). 
51 Id. 
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important problems for a close corporation using a before-the-fact perspective.52 Shareholders’ 
agreements give flexibility to the participants in the corporation, bearing in mind the fact that the 
problems in close corporations are quite different from those in public corporations.53  
Also, legislation has provided in recent years flexibility for the participant in business.54 
The legislation has transformed from less prescriptive rules to more enabling rules.55 In this 
manner, shareholders can reach almost any kind of agreement.56 Shareholders have a wide road 
to define the terms of their relationship and avoid other mechanisms that come into play.57  
 
B. FUNCTIONS OF SHAREHOLDERS’ AGREEMENTS: A WAY TO SOLVE TENSIONS 
AMONG SHAREHOLDERS 
The central problem in the corporate governance structure of close corporations is how to 
find the most reasonable degree of adaptability and protection from the opportunism of either the 
majority or minority shareholders.58 At the same time, shareholders in close corporations require 
flexibility for their business and personal interests.59 Shareholders’ agreements are the most 
successful device to mitigate the application and effect of traditional corporate rules in the 
context of close corporations.60 Besides, shareholders’ agreements could be a very helpful 
                                                 
52 GEVURTZ, supra note 17, at 481. 
53 George D. Hornestein, Stockholders’ Agreements in the Closely Held Corporation, 59 YALE L. J. 1040 (1950). 
54 Easterbrook and Fischel, supra note 1, at 279-80.  
55 Id. 
56 Id. 
57 O’KELLEY, supra note 50, at 216 (commenting that “[a]s a result, these gaps must be filled ex-post, as a need to 
adapt actually occurs. Normally, gaps are filled by shareholders themselves acting by consensus. If consensus is not 
possible, then the close corporation contract’s gap-filling process will come in to play.”). 
58 O’KELLEY and THOMPSON, supra note 14, at 383. See MILLAR, supra note 34, at 383-384 (explaining that 
“[s]hareholder disputes present one of the most difficult and potentially destructive problems which arise in the 
context of the close corporation. A U.S. study conducted in Chicago, Illinios revealed that shareholder dissension 
was a major cause of business failures for the close corporation. Shareholder disputes are responsible for a wide a 
variety of business problems including loss of management time and increased cost.”). 
59 Siedel, supra note 2, at 384. 
60 Hornestein, supra note 53, at 1041. 
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instrument in the environment of international commercial transactions and corporations with 
shareholders in different nations.61   
 
1. PROTECTION FOR MINORITY SHAREHOLDERS IN CLOSE CORPORATIONS 
A close corporation is the perfect environment for majority opportunism.62 Majority 
opportunism is possible if the following aspects are combined together in a close corporation:63 i) 
application of the majority rule;64 ii) separation of functions among shareholders, directors and 
officers; iii) lack of guaranteed employment or dividend rights for shareholders; and iv) 
impossibility to apply the unilateral dissolution mechanism.  
In a close corporation, the traditional norms of corporate governance structure plus the 
lack of a public market for shares65 leaves the minority shareholder vulnerable to the majority.66 
Under the majority rule, the relationship between majority-minority shareholders might finish in 
what is called a “freeze out/squeeze-out”.67 In a squeeze out/freeze out, a majority shareholder 
                                                 
61 MILLAR, supra note 34, at 417 (commenting that “[p]articularly for the international investor, well-drafted 
contractual shareholder arrangements can be critical in governing the shareholder relationship. Contractually agreed 
upon choice of law provisions, buyout provisions, provisions permitting minority veto power in certain 
circumstances, employment contracts, and other special agreements which provide for dividend payments or other 
matters are extremely helpful in reducing potential shareholder disputes. Thus, provide for dividend payments or 
other are matters are extremely helpful in reducing potential shareholder disputes. Thus, contractual arrangements 
should be encouraged in the case of corporations owned by shareholders of different nations.”). 
62 O’KELLEY and THOMPSON, supra note 14, at  383. 
63 Id.  
64 See MILLAR, supra note 34, at 386 (explaining that “[t]he doctrine of majority rule creates the possibility for 
majority shareholders to make decisions which further their own interest at the expense of the minority owners.”).  
65 Id. at 385 (suggesting that the main reason for close corporation problems is the no existence of a market 
mechanism and the fact that each shareholder is dependent on the other shareholders either to buy or sell their shares 
when exists irreconcilable positions.). 
66 O’KELLEY and THOMPSON, supra note 14 at 382. 
67 GEVURTZ, supra note 17, at 450.  
 12
                                                                                                                                                             
 
 
uses his/her control over the corporation against a minority shareholder in a way that the latter 
could not participate in the management and earnings of the corporation.68  
Therefore, a shareholder agreement may be a key instrument to protect minority 
shareholders from the majority.69 The agreement’s primary goal is to give the minority 
shareholder participation in the management of the corporation or a more important role in the 
decision-making process.70 In this case, the majority is willing to share some of its control in 
order to encourage people who, under normal circumstances, would not buy a minority interest.71   
 
2. BALANCE AMONG SHAREHOLDERS WITH SIMILAR POWER AND INTERESTS 
In a close corporation, two or more not controlling shareholders could constitute a 
majority whose primary objective is to assure that the parties in the agreement will make 
decisions concerning the corporation together.72 In fact, no shareholder has majority over the 
other shareholders by him/herself. The corporation has a control group composed by of a small 
                                                 
68 James M. Van Vliet Jr. & Mark D. Snider, The Evolving Fiduciary Duty Solution for Shareholders Caught in a 
Closely Held Corporation Trap, 18 N. ILL. U. L. REV. 239, 258 (1998) (explaining that “[f]reeze-out” and “squeeze-
out” are labels used in the case decisions without identifying any clear difference in meaning between the two. For 
purposes of this article, a “freeze-out/squeeze-out” is actionable conduct by which a particular shareholder is 
excluded form, or severely limited in, his or her participation in the financial benefits and other “partner attributes” 
of shareholding in a closely held corporation, so as to destroy or drastically impair the value of its stock ownership. 
Often, this ultimately is accompanied by an attempt to force the shareholder to sell its stock in the corporation, 
usually at a price favorable to the buyer.”). See Moll, supra note 36, at 758.(commenting that “[c]ommon freeze-out 
techniques include the termination of a minority shareholder’s employment, the refusal to declare dividends, the 
removal of a minority shareholder form a position of management, and the siphoning off of corporate earnings 
through high compensation to the majority shareholder.”).  
69 CHOOPER ET AL., supra note 44, at 771 (suggesting that “[t]he best protection that can be extended a client about 
to enter into a corporate venture is a well-drawn agreement between shareholders designed to safeguard their interest 
on a mutually fair basis.  This is not a guarantee against litigation –since law suits have been generated concerning 
the application and interpretation of such agreements, but such law suits are comparatively small in number.”).  
70 O’NEIL and THOMPSON, supra note 6 at 5:2, 5:5. Hornestein, supra note 53, at 1041.  
71 O’NEIL and THOMPSON, supra note 6 at 5:2, 5:5. 
72 Id. See Hornestein, supra note 53, at 1040. 
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number of shareholders instead of a controlling shareholder.73 In this case, the existence of an 
equilibrium among shareholders is a feature of the business agreement.74 
Shareholders want to maintain the control of the corporation regardless of the changes in 
the future. At the same time, shareholders in a close corporation expect to have employment, role 
management and return on their investment.75 In addition, most of the shareholders in a close 
corporation have their wealth invested in the corporation.76 Therefore, the decisions made by the 
corporation could affect each shareholder significantly.77  
In this context, shareholders will implement specific devices to protect their investment.78 
A very useful solution for shareholders is to have in advance a contractual device, applicable 
when it is needed to solve differences among shareholders.79 The contractual device solution 
could work really well in the closed corporation environment because there is a small number of 
shareholders in the negotiation process.80   
                                                 
73 Mary Siegel, Fiduciary Myths in Close Corporate Law, 29 DEL. J. CORP. L. 377, 384 (2004). 
74 O’NEIL and THOMPSON, supra note 6, at 5:45. 
75 Moll, supra note 36, at 757. 
76 CHOOPER ET AL., supra note 44, at 711. Thompson, supra note 10, at 394 (explaining that “[u]nlike shareholders 
in public corporations who develop diversified portfolios to eliminate the risk of some losses, shareholders in a close 
corporation often do not or cannon develop a diversified portfolio, thus exposing them to increased risk of loss 
because of their limited holdings. A participant in a close corporation is more likely to have a firm-specific 
investment in the enterprise, thereby increasing the risk that other participants may act opportunistically to 
appropriate for themselves the quasi-rents of these specialized assets.”). 
77 See Id. 
78 See Id. 
79 See Van Vliet &  Snider, supra note 68, at 242-243 (1998). 
80 Thompson, supra note 10, at 393. 
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CHAPTER IV 
CLASSES AND ISSUES COVERED BY SHAREHOLDERS’ AGREEMENTS 
 
The issues normally covered by shareholders’ agreements are related to those which 
regulate shareholder actions and those which control director functions.81  
 
A. SHAREHOLDERS’ AGREEMENTS CONCERNING SHAREHOLDER 
DECISIONS 
The agreements which regulate shareholder actions cover issues agreed in advance 
among the participants as to how to act in the exercise of their rights as shareholders.82 In the 
group of shareholder actions we find those called “shareholding” or “pooling agreement” [this is 
a simple contract providing that the shareholders will vote their shares as a unit in the election of 
directors and other matters],83 proxy agreements [this is a contract that create irrevocable proxies 
which take away the shareholders’ power to vote their shares and vest that power in one or more 
of the shareholders or in other persons]84 and voting trusts [this is a contract which transfer legal 
title of the share to trustees, who vote the shares in accordance with the terms of the trust 
instrument.].85  
                                                 
81 O’NEIL and THOMPSON, supra note 6, at 5:2, 5:6. 
82 O’KELLEY and THOMPSON, supra note 14, at 401. 
83GEVURTZ, supra note 17, at 486. 
84 Id. 
85 CHOOPER ET AL., supra note 46, at 736 (according to the authors voting trust came in to existence for two main 
reasons: (1) “Desinged in response to the judicial aversion to the separation of ownership from control, it results in 
the trustees having legal title to the shares, as well as the right to vote in the manner agreed on”; and (2) “Existing 
creditors or senior security holders of a financially unstable corporation may require, as a condition  of permitting  
the corporation to continue (or be reorganized), that they be given control through the mechanism of a voting trust. 
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B. SHAREHOLDERS’ AGREEMENTS CONCERNING DIRECTOR DECISIONS 
The agreements concerning directors’ functions are about management of the 
corporation. Management in a close corporation usually depends on shareholders’ will.86 The 
concept of an independent board of directors separate from the shareholders is a fiction that does 
not apply in the close corporation context.87 Therefore, shareholders celebrate agreements to 
adapt the traditional corporate rules according to their needs.88 The new rules determine who is 
to have control of the corporation and how that control is to be exercised.89 
 The issues included in these agreements could determine many different issues which 
normally are functions of the board of directors. Many agreements contain provisions like: i) 
designating corporate officers and determining their compensation and tenure;90 ii) undertakings 
by shareholders assuring permanent employment by corporation;91 iii) agreements providing veto 
                                                                                                                                                             
Lenders or providers of fresh capital may utilize a voting trust to afford them control of or a voice in the selection of 
new management or assurance that the corporation’s present successful management will be continued.”). 
86 LAVALLE, supra note 48, at 109. 
87 O’NEIL and THOMPSON, supra note 6, at 5:25. 
88 LAVALLE, supra note 48, at 109. 
89 Id. See O’NEIL and THOMPSON, supra note 6, at 5:25. 
90 See MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT § 7.32 (a)(3) (2005) (providing that “(a) An agreement among the shareholders or a 
corporation that complies with this section in effective among the shareholders and the corporation even though it is 
inconsistent with one or more other provisions of this Act in that it: (3) establishes who shall be directors or officers 
of the corporation, or their terms of office or manner of selection removal;”). See DEL. CODE ANN. tit 8 § 354 
(2005) (providing that “[n]o written agreement among stockholders of a close corporation, nor any provision of the 
certificate of incorporation or of the bylaws of the corporation, which agreement or provision relates to any phase of 
the affairs of such corporation, including but not limited to the management of its business or declaration and 
payment of dividends or other division of profits or the election of directors or officers or the employment of 
stockholders by the corporation or the arbitration of disputes, shall be invalid on the ground that it is an attempt by 
the parties to the agreement or by the stockholders of the corporation  to treat the corporation as if it were a 
partnership or to arrange relations among the stockholders or between the stockholders and the corporation in a 
manner that would be appropriate only among partners.”) See O’NEIL and THOMPSON, supra note 6, at 5:114 
(commenting that “[m]any agreements among shareholders in close corporations contain provisions naming the 
persons who are to occupy some or all corporate offices or granting one or more of the contracting parties the 
privilege of naming corporate officers.”). 
91 O’NEIL and THOMPSON, supra note 6, at 5:127 (commenting that “[c]losely related to provisions in shareholders’ 
agreements naming persons to corporate offices are undertakings by shareholders guaranteeing one or more 
individuals permanent employment for a long or indefinite period or time.”). 
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arrangements;92 iv) agreements controlling dividend policy or providing for distribution or 
corporate assets or profits (agreements could include a prohibition of declaring dividends for a 
limited period of time or under specific circumstances, a shareholder veto power to declare 
dividends, a provision which provides that not dividends could be declared until the corporation 
pay a loan);93 v) inclusion of arbitration clauses for settling a dispute among shareholders;94 vi) 
agreements governing dissolution, buyouts and other remedies for deadlock;95 vii) agreements 
about transfer restrictions among the shareholders and the corporation;96 and viii) any other issue 
                                                 
92 See MODEL BUS CORP ACT § 7.32 (a)(4) (2005) (providing that “(a) An agreement among the shareholders or a 
corporation that complies with this section in effective among the shareholders and the corporation even though it is 
inconsistent with one or more other provisions of this Act in that it: (4) governs, in general or in regard to specific 
matters, the exercise or division of voting power by or between the shareholders and directors or by or among any of 
them, including use of weighted voting rights or director proxies;”). O’NEIL and THOMPSON, supra note 6, at 5:128-
29 (explaining that “[v]eto provisions vary considerable in content. They may be designed to give a power of veto to 
only one of the shareholders or the each of the shareholders. The veto may be limited to fundamental changes in the 
corporation structure, such as charter amendments or mergers, or it may cover all major policy decisions or even day 
to day decisions on the operation of the business.”). 
93 See MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT § 7.32 (a)(2) (2005) (providing that “(a) An agreement among the shareholders or a 
corporation that complies with this section in effective among the shareholders and the corporation even though it is 
inconsistent with one or more other provisions of this Act in that it: (2) governs the authorization or making of 
distributions whether or not in proportion to ownership of shares, subject to the limitation in section 6.40;”). See 
DEL. CODE ANN. tit 8 § 354 (2005). See O’NEIL and THOMPSON, supra note 6, at 5:133 (commenting that 
“[p]articipants in a close corporation occasionally attempt to control its dividend policy by agreement among 
themselves.”). 
94 See DEL. CODE ANN. tit 8 §354 (2005). See O’NEIL and THOMPSON, supra note 6, at 5:138 (commenting that 
“[a]rbitration is one of the least expensive and least disruptive ways of settling a dispute among shareholders, and 
shareholders’ agreements often contain a clause providing for the arbitration of disputes arising out of the 
agreement.”). 
95 See MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT § 7.32 (a)(6)(7) (2005) (providing that “(a) An agreement among the shareholders or 
a corporation that complies with this section in effective among the shareholders and the corporation even though it 
is inconsistent with one or more other provisions of this Act in that it: (6) transfer to one or more shareholders or 
other persons all or part of the authority to exercise the corporate powers or to manage the business and affairs or the 
corporation, including the resolution of any issue about which there exists a deadlock among directors or 
shareholders; (7) requires dissolution of the corporation at the request of one or more of the shareholders or upon the 
occurrence of a specified event;”). See O’NEIL and THOMPSON, supra note 6, at 5:138 (commenting that 
“[s]hareholders in a close corporation may enter into a contract for the dissolution of the corporation in the event of 
a deadlock among its shareholders and directors, or on the happening of specified contingencies perhaps different 
form those which otherwise would justify dissolution under the statutes. Similarly, they may contract for on or more 
shareholders to buy out others rights in the event of deadlock or other stated contingencies.”). 
96 See DEL. CODE ANN. tit 8 § 354 (2005).  
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dealing with the relationship among shareholders or which governs the exercise of corporate 
powers and is not contrary to public policy.97 
                                                 
97 See MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT § 7.32 (2005) (providing that “(a) An agreement among the shareholders or a 
corporation that complies with this section in effective among the shareholders and the corporation even though it is 
inconsistent with one or more other provisions of this Act in that it: (8) otherwise governs the exercise or the 
corporate powers of the management of the business and affairs of the corporation or the relationship among the 
shareholders, the directors and the corporation, or among any of them, and it not contrary to public policy.”). See 
DEL. CODE ANN. tit 8 § 354 (2005). 
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CHAPTER V 
ENFORCEMENT OF SHAREHOLDERS’ AGREEMENTS 
 
A. ENFORCEMENT OF SHAREHOLDERS’ AGREEMENTS CONCERNING 
SHAREHOLDER DECISIONS 
1. EVOLUTION 
In the U.S. courts, the enforcement of shareholders’ agreements concerning issues 
normally in the power of shareholders has been an object of discussion.98 Most of the initial 
decisions of courts considered voting agreements invalid.99 The main two reasons for 
invalidating the agreements were i) the idea that the power to vote was treated as inseparable 
from the shares and ii) the idea that shareholders owe to the each other a duty to vote in the 
corporation meetings in the best interest of the corporation.100  
Today, the trend toward the validity and enforcement of shareholders’ agreements 
concerning shareholder issues has a most positive perspective in courts.101 The enactment of 
statutes expressly authorizing this kind of agreement has been the best way to avoid discussion 
about the validity of shareholders’ agreements concerning shareholder decisions.102 The MBCA 
and D.G.C.L. provide specific rules for the enforcement of pooling agreements,103 proxy 
agreements,104 and voting trust. 105 
                                                 
98 O’NEIL and THOMPSON,  supra note 6, at 5:11. 
99 Id. 
100 Id. at 5:12-13. 
101 Id. at 5:15. 
102 Id. at 5:17. 
103 See MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT § 7.31 (2005). It provides that: 
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2. STATUTORY REQUIREMENTS FOR ENFORCENT 
i) Pooling Agreements 
Pooling agreements are contracts in which shareholders agree to vote their shares in a 
specific manner.106 Pooling agreements could include a variety of issues relating to shareholders’ 
                                                                                                                                                             
“(a) Two or more shareholders may provide for the manner in which they will vote their shares by signing an 
agreement for that purpose. A voting agreement created under this section is not subject to the provisions of 
section 7.30. 
(b) A voting agreement created under this section is specifically enforceable.”. 
See DEL. CODE ANN. tit 8 §2 18 (c) (2005). It provides that: 
“(c) An agreement between 2 or more stockholders, if in writing and signed by the parties thereto, may provide 
that in exercising any voting rights, the shares held by them shall be voted as provided by the agreement, or as 
the parties may agree, or as determined in accordance with a procedure agreed upon them.”. 
104 See MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT  § 7.22 (a)(b)(d) (2005). It provides that: 
      “(a)  A shareholder may vote his shares in person or by proxy. 
(b)  A shareholder or his agent or attorney-in-fact may appoint a proxy to vote or otherwise act for the 
shareholder by signing an appointment form, or by an electronic transmission. An electronic transmission 
must contain or be accompanied by information from which one can determine that the shareholder, the 
shareholder’s agent, or the shareholder’s attorney-in-fact authorized the electronic transmission. 
(d) An appointment of a proxy is revocable unless the appointment form or electronic transmission states that it 
is irrevocable and the appointment is coupled with an interest. Appointments coupled with an interest 
include the appointment of: 
(1) a pledge; 
(2) a person who purchased or agreed to purchase the shares; 
(3) a creditor of the corporation who extended it credit under terms requiring the appointment; 
(4) an employee of the corporation whose employment contract requires the appointment; or 
(5) a party to a voting agreement created under section 7.31”. 
     See DEL. CODE ANN. tit 8 § 212 (c). 
105 See MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT § 7.30. It provides that: 
“(a) One or more shareholders may create a voting trust, conferring on a trustee the right to vote or otherwise 
the act for them, by signing an agreement setting out the provisions of the trust (which may include 
anything consistent with its purpose) and transferring their shares to the trustee. When a voting trust 
agreement is signed, the trustee shall prepare a list of the names and address of all owners of beneficial 
interest in the trust, together with the number and class of shares each transfer to the trust, and deliver 
copies of the list and agreement to the corporation’s principal office. 
(b) A voting trust becomes effective on the date the first shares subject to the trust are registered in the trustee’s 
name. A voting trust is valid for no more than ten years after its effective date unless extended under 
subsection (c). 
(c) All or some of the parties to a voting trust may extend it for additional terms of not more than ten years 
each by signing written consent to the extension.  An extension is valid for 10 years form the date the first 
shareholder signs the extension agreement. The voting trustee must deliver copies of the extension 
agreement and list of beneficial owners to the corporation’s principal office. An extension agreement binds 
only those parties signing it.”. 
   See DEL. CODE ANN. tit 8 § 218. 
106 GEVURTZ, supra note 17, at 486. 
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needs. Normally, pooling agreements include:107 i) agreement to vote shares for directors; ii) 
agreement giving voting power disproportionate to shareholdings; or iii) agreement to vote 
shares so as to effectuate a particular corporate policy. Pooling agreements regulating these 
issues have been considered lawful and enforceable.108  Nevertheless, courts have invalidated 
agreements when a shareholder sells his vote or compromises voting power under considerations 
of some personal benefit.109 
The statutory requirements for pooling agreements in the MBCA and DGCL are: i) Two 
or more shareholders must participate in the agreement (shareholders part of the agreement could 
be a minority, a majority or all of them, the requirement is quantitative and not qualitative);110 ii) 
the agreement must be in writing;111 and iii) the agreement must be signed by all the participating 
shareholders.112 
                                                 
107 O’NEIL and THOMPSON, supra note 6, at 5:45-5:63. 
108 See Manson V. Curtis, 223 N.Y. 313, 319, 119 N.E. 559 (1918) (providing that: “[a]n ordinary agreement, among 
a minority number, but a majority in shares, for the purpose of obtaining control of the corporation by the election of 
particular persons as directors is not illegal. Shareholders have the right to combine their interest and voting powers 
to secure such control of the corporation and the adoption of and adhesion by it to a specific policy and course of 
business. Agreement upon a sufficient consideration upon them, of such intendment and effect, are valid and 
binding, if they do not contravene any express charter or statutory provision or contemplate any fraud, oppression, 
or wrong against other stockholders, or other illegal object.”). 
109 See Hall v. John S. Isaacs & Sons Farms, Inc. 37 Del. Ch. 530, 549, 146 A.2d 602, 613 (1958), aff’d in part, 39 
Del. Ch. 244, 163 A.2d 288 (1960) (“The rule which forbids the voting of purchased votes is not limited to instances 
where the consideration for the purchase is strictly a corporate office and its emoluments. Shareholder votes may not 
be purchased for any consideration personal to the stockholder,”). See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS 
§193 (1981) (providing that “[a] promise by a fiduciary to violate his fiduciary duty or promise that tends to induce 
such a violation is unenforceable on ground of public policy.” The official comments to this section establish: “The 
rule applies by analogy to shareholders with reference to their voting powers, although is does not preclude 
agreements where the only advantage bargained for is one that will accrue to all shareholders through the ownership 
of shares.”). 
110 See MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT § 7.31 (a) (2005) (requiring the participation of “[t]wo or more shareholders” in 
voting agreements). See DEL. CODE ANN. tit 8 § 218 (c) (2005) (providing that a voting agreements is “[a]n 
agreement between 2 or more stockholders”). 
111 See Official Comment Section 7.31 (a) MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT (2005) (providing that “[t]he only formal 
requirements are that they [voting agreements] be in writing and signed by all the participating stockholders”). See 
DEL. CODE ANN. tit 8 § 218 (c) (2005) (providing that “if in writing and signed by the parties thereto” the voting 
agreements may regulate the exercise of voting rights among stockholders). 
112 See MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT § 7.31 (a) (2005) (providing that it is necessary to sign “an agreement for that 
purpose [way to vote their shares]”). See DEL. CODE ANN. tit 8 § 218 (c) (2005) (providing that “if in writing and 
signed by the parties thereto” the voting agreements may regulate the exercise of voting rights among stockholders). 
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ii) Proxy Agreements 
Under this agreement, the pooling or voting agreement goes one step further.113 Besides 
the existence of an agreement covering how the shareholders are suppose to vote certain matters, 
shareholders create irrevocable proxies which vest the power to vote their shares in one or more 
persons, who could be either shareholders or other persons.114 The reason for the further step is a 
way to secure that the shares will be voted according to the terms of the agreement without 
delays and uncertainties.115 
Historically, the idea of an irrevocable proxy has been questioned.116 However, statutes 
have establishes the requirements for an irrevocable proxy to be enforceable.117 The 
requirements solve clearly many of the questions used in the past to challenge irrevocable 
proxies.118  The statutory requirements are: i) the proxy must be in writing;119 ii) the proxy must 
be signed or must contained information from which it can be determined that the writing 
                                                 
113 O’NEIL and THOMPSON, supra note 6, at 5:8-9. 
114 Id.  
115 Id at 5:64-65 (commenting that “[a] proxy may be advantageous in a voting agreement to facilitate the carrying 
out of the agreement and to avoid the possibility that a suit for specific performance, with the attendant uncertainties 
and delays, will be necessary to implement decisions reached under the agreement”). 
116 Id. (commenting that the different attacks on the idea of an irrevocable proxy are: “(1) the right to vote is an 
essential attribute of stock, and consequently the owner cannot irrevocably detach it form the shares; irrevocable 
proxies are void as against public policy in that they unreasonably restrict the free alienability of the shares by 
preventing the purchaser form exercising one of the essential rights of stock ownership, namely, the right to vote the 
shares; (3) some agreements utilizing irrevocable proxies are indistinguishable in affect from voting trust and should 
be invalidated if they do not comply with the requirements of the voting trust statute; (4) a proxy, being an agency, 
is revocable unless coupled with an interest, and that is so even though it is stated to be irrevocable; and (5) an 
irrevocable proxy violates a statutory limitation on the duration of proxies or a statutory rule providing that all 
proxies shall be revocable.”). 
117 See supra note 104. 
118 Id. at 5:75-78. 
119 See MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT § 7.22 (b) (2005) (providing that a shareholder “may appoint a proxy to vote or 
otherwise act for the shareholder by signing an appointment form or by an electronic transmission”. DEL. CODE 
ANN. tit 8 § 212 (c)(2) (providing that “[a] stockholder may authorize another person or persons to act for such 
stockholder as proxy by transmitting or authorizing the transmission of a telegram, cablegram, or other means of 
electronic transmission to the person who will be the holder of the proxy”). 
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document was authorized by the shareholder;120 iii) the proxy will have a time limit, unless it 
provides for a longer period;121 iv) the proxy is irrevocable if it states that it is irrevocable and it 
is coupled with an interest;122 and v) the writing document or the electronic transmission is 
received by the corporation.123 
 
iii) Voting Trust 
Under this method, shareholders transfer their shares to trustees, who vote the shares in 
accordance with the terms of the agreement.124 Therefore, the trustee becomes the legal owner of 
the shares but usually the former shareholder retains economic benefits of the shares.125 
Generally, the trustee gives to the former shareholder “voting trust certificates” as evidence of 
                                                 
120 See MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT § 7.22 (b) (2005) (providing that shareholders “may appoint a proxy to vote or 
otherwise act for the shareholder by signing an appointment form or by an electronic transmission. An electronic 
transmission must contain or be accompanied by information from which one can determine that the shareholder, the 
shareholder’s agent, or the shareholder’s attorney-in-fact authorized the electronic transmission.”). See DEL. CODE 
ANN. tit 8 § 212 (c)(2) (2005) (providing that there must be “information form which can be determined that the 
telegram, cablegram or other electronic transmission was authorized by the stockholder.”).  
121 See MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT Section 7.22 (c) (2005) (providing that “[a]n appointment is valid for 11 months 
unless a longer period is expressly provided in the appointment.”). See DEL. CODE ANN. tit 8 § 212 (b) (2005). 
(providing that “no such proxy shall be voted or acted upon after 3 years from its date, unless the proxy provides for 
a longer period.”). 
122 See MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT § 7.22 (d) (2005) (providing that “[a]n appointment of a proxy is revocable unless 
the appointment form or electronic transmission states that it is irrevocable and the appointment is coupled with an 
interest. Appointment coupled with an interest includes the appointment of: (5) a party of a voting agreement created 
under section 7.31”). See DEL. CODE ANN. tit 8 § 212 (e) (2005) (providing that “[a] duly executed proxy shall be 
irrevocable if it states that it is irrevocable and if, and only as long as, it is coupled with an interest sufficient in law 
to support an irrevocable power. A proxy may be made irrevocable regardless or whether the interest with which it 
is couples is an interest in the stock itself or an interest in the corporation generally.”). 
123 See MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT § 7.22 (c) (2005) (providing that “[a]n appointment of a proxy is effective when a 
signed appointment form or an electronic transmission of the appointment is received by the inspector or election or 
the officer or agent of the corporation authorized to tabulate votes.”). See DEL. CODE ANN. tit 8 § 212 (c)(2) (2005) 
(providing that “[i]f is determined that such telegrams, cablegrams or other electronic transmissions are valid, the 
inspectors or, if the are no inspectors, such other persons making that determination shall specify the information 
upon which they relied.”). 
124 GEVURTZ, supra note 17, at 492. 
125 Id. (explaining that “[s]ince the trustee receives their title in trust to act for the benefit, typically, of the former 
shareholder, the former shareholders give up legal title bur retain beneficial ownership.  This means that the trustees 
normally forward to the former shareholders any dividends received form the corporation, and transfer the stock 
back to the former owners upon termination of the trust.”). 
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the economic benefit of the shares.126 Provisions in a voting trust could regulate any material and 
procedural issues concerning shareholders’ decisions.127 
The statutory requirements for voting trust agreements in the MBCA and D.G.C.L. are: i) 
One or two or more shareholders must participate in the agreement (there is not a quantitative 
requirement for shareholders to enter in a voting trusts, [e.g. one, two, all] the only requirement 
is qualitative: being a shareholder of the corporation);128 ii) the agreement must be in writing;129 
iii) the agreement must be signed;130 iv) the transfer of the shares to the trustee or trustees by the 
shareholder;131 v) the voting trust have a statutory time limit132 under the MBCA133 and a 
                                                 
126 O’NEIL and THOMPSON, supra note 6, at 5:78-79. 
127 Id. at 5:80-81 (mentioning matters ordinarily cover in a voting trust: how trustees are to be selected and how 
vacancies among the trustees are to be filled, whether trustees can be removed, the responsibility and liability of the 
trusties for their actions, circumstances in which the trust can be amended or terminated, if trustees may elect 
themselves as directors or officers of the corporation, if the voting rights are limited to some decisions or if they 
include fundamental corporate changes, etc). 
128 See MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT § 730 (a) (2005) (requiring the participation of “[o]ne or more shareholders”). DEL. 
CODE ANN. tit 8 §218 (a) (2005) (requiring the participation of “[o]ne stockholder or 2 or more stockholders”). 
129 The Model Business Corporation Act does not explicitly state that the agreement must be in writing but the 
requirement could be clearly understood from the context of the following provision: “One or more shareholders 
may create a voting trust, conferring on a trustee the right to vote or otherwise act for them, by signing an agreement 
setting out the provision of the trust”. See DEL. CODE ANN. tit 8 §218 (a) (2005) (providing that “[o]ne stockholder 
or 2 or more stockholders may by agreement in writing” transfer shares). 
130 See MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT  § 730 (a) (2005) (providing that “[o]ne or more shareholders may create a voting 
trust, conferring on a trustee the right to vote or otherwise act for them, by signing an agreement setting out the 
provision of the trust”). The Delaware Code Annotated title 8 § 218 (a) does not explicitly stated that the agreement 
must be signed but the requirement could be clearly understood from the context of the following provision: “One 
stockholder or 2 or more stockholders may by agreement in writing deposit capital stock of an original issue with or 
transfer capital stock to any person or persons”). 
131 See MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT § 730 (a) (2005) (requiring the transfer of shares “to the trustee.”). See DEL. CODE 
ANN. tit 8 §218 (a) (2005) (providing the “transfer [of] capital stock to any person or persons”). 
132 See Gevurtz, supra note 17, at 494 (explaining that “[p]resumably, the reason for limiting the length of a voting 
trust lies in concerns about changing circumstances over time rendering obsolete the original intent behind the trust 
and the instructions in the trust agreement –albeit, one might wonder why this is not a danger which the founders of 
the trust can asses for themselves.”). 
133 See MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT Section 730 (b) and (c) (2005). It provides that: “(b) A voting trust becomes 
effective on the date the first shares subject to the trust are registered in the trustee’s name. A voting trust is valid for 
no more than ten years after its effective date unless extended under subsection (c). (c) All or some of the parties to a 
voting trust may extend it for additional terms of not more than ten years each by signing written consent to the 
extension.  An extension is valid for 10 years form the date the first shareholder signs the extension agreement. The 
voting trustee must deliver copies of the extension agreement and list of beneficial owners to the corporation’s 
principal office. An extension agreement binds only those parties signing it.”. 
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contractual time limit under D.G.C.L.134 (this is an important difference between the two 
statutory rules); and vi) the corporation must be informed of the voting trust agreement but the 
two statutory models have different rules for this process.135  
The MBCA requires the trustee to prepare a list and “deliver copies of the list and 
agreement to the corporation principal office”.136 In addition, this statute states that the voting 
trust “becomes effective on the date the first shares subject to the trust are registered in the 
trustee’s name”.137 On the other hand, the D.G.C.L. requires the filling of a “copy of the 
agreement in the registered office of the corporation” and the copy shall be available to the 
inspection of any stockholder of the corporation.138   
Finally, the MBCA and the D.G.C.L. establish clearly that the requirements of the voting 
trust are not applicable to other kinds of agreements which could exist without interference of the 
special rules for voting trust.139 The reason for this provision is judicial decisions which in the 
past left some uncertainties about the validity of shareholders’ voting agreements different from 
voting trust agreements.140 
 
 
 
                                                 
134 DEL. CODE ANN. tit 8 § 218 (a) (2005) (providing that “[t]he voting trustee or trustees may vote the stock so 
issued or transferred during the period specified in the agreement.”). 
135 See MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT § 730 (a)(b) (2005). See DEL. CODE ANN. tit 8 § 218 (a) (2005). 
136 MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT § 730 (a) (2005). 
137 MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT § 730 (b) (2005). 
138 DEL CODE ANN tit 8 § 218 (a) (2005). See GEVURTZ, supra note 17, at 493 (commenting that “[t]his filing 
requirement stands in marked contrast to the normal lack or such a notice requirement for shareholder voting 
contracts”).  
139 See MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT § 731 (a) (2005) (providing that “[a] voting agreement created under this section is 
not subject to the provisions of section 7.30). See DEL. CODE ANN. tit 8 §218 (c) (2005) (providing that “[t]his 
section shall not be deemed to invalidate any voting or other agreement among stockholders or any irrevocable 
proxy which is not otherwise illegal”). 
140 O’NEIL and THOMPSON, supra note 6, at 5:95-96. 
